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Can an Industry Voluntary Agreement on Food Traceability Minimize the Cost of Food 
Safety Incidents? 
 
Abstract:  In  the  recent  past  the  United  States  has  had  a  number  of  severe  food-safety 
outbreaks in the produce, vegetable and beef industry that greatly disrupted the food 
system. In all these outbreaks here were severe disruptions on sales that affected the 
whole industry, and it took an extended period of time to correctly locate the source of 
the outbreak. Traceability can be an effective tool to reduce the impact of food safety 
incidents my expediting the search for the origin of outbreaks.  This paper investigates 
to  what  extent  an  industry-led  voluntary  agreement  for  providing  traceability  can 
reduce  the  cost  of  a  food-safety  outbreak.  We  find  that  a  voluntary  agreement  on 
traceability can successfully reduce the cost of a food-safety outbreak but will unlikely 
achieve the optimal social level of traceability because of significant free riding.  
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Can an Industry Voluntary Agreement on Food Traceability Minimize the Cost of Food 
Safety Incidents? 
 
1. Introduction  
In the recent past the United States has had a number of severe food-safety outbreaks in the 
produce, vegetable and beef industry that greatly disrupted the food system. Examples 
include the 2003 outbreak of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (or “mad-cow disease”) 
that banned American beef exports to key Asian markets (Goldstein 2003), the 2005 fresh 
spinach E. coli outbreak which halted spinach sales for California farmers (Calvin 2007), 
and, most recently, the 2008 Salmonella outbreak which had disastrous effects on the 
lucrative tomato industry after the pathogen was initially traced to tomato farmers (Shin 
2008). Weeks later, the source of the outbreak was eventually found to be jalapeño peppers 
imported from Mexico (Venkataraman 2008). 
  There are two common features to all of these outbreaks: 1) there were severe 
disruptions on sales that affected the whole industry, and 2) it took an extended period of 
time to correctly locate the source of the outbreak. Of course these two features are highly 
linked because the longer it takes to find the source of the problem, the longer consumers and 
government remain uncertainty about the nature and extent of the problem, which results in 
larger economic losses. In the short run, economic losses are typically due to food-product 
bans, product recalls, disposure of contaminated food, public heath impacts and in the long 
run the economic losses are mainly due consumer’s distrust and lost of goodwill. A potential 
way to decrease the economic costs of food-safety issues is by implementing traceability in 
food-supply chains. Traceability, as applied to food products, provides detailed product 
information on product’s origins and location, characteristics and production processes that   3 
can be used to more easily identify the source of a food safety issue (Pouliot and Sumner 
2008). 
Traceability was one of the main tools introduced in new food legislation by the 
European Union (EU) as a response to a similar series of food scares that disrupted European 
food supply in the late 1990s (European Parliament and Council 2002). Pressure is mounting 
over the FDA to introduce traceability as a way to expedite the search for the origin of food-
safety issues and thus reduce the costs to both consumers and industries (Just-food.com 
2008). Although a number of experts suggest that problems in the US food supply are due to 
shortcomings in the legal system or lack of mandatory regulations, in a recent interview Dr. 
David Acheson, Associate Commissioner for Food at FDA, remarked that the FDA lacked 
the authority to mandate traceability systems and urged the industry to voluntarily take the 
initiative (Venkataraman 2008). 
The argument on whether traceability should be an initiative of the industry or 
government authorities has already been considered in the literature. Golan et al. (2004) 
studied the implementation of traceability systems in the US and concluded it may be 
inefficient when imposed by governments. Hobbs (2004) argues that the discussion on 
whether traceability should be a public or private responsibility lies on the eventuality and 
extent of market failures. In other words, even though traceability may have clear private 
benefits, such as improving logistics and facilitating procurement, it may also have large 
public benefits as it can potentially reduce the frequency and/or severity of food-safety 
outbreaks (Meuwissen et al. 2003; Golan et al. 2004).  
Given that traceability exhibits public good characteristics, its private provision by 
individual firms will likely be suboptimal; as firms will attempt to benefit from the provision 
of traceability without bearing the cost of providing it. This point is argued by Havinga 
(2006) who raises concerns about how effective the private sector may be in delivering   4 
controls that coincide with societal goals, given the public good dimension of food safety. 
Indeed the consequences of inadequate levels of traceability may be very costly, as 
highlighted by the recent outbreaks in the United States. In short, when traceability provides 
public benefits, its privately optimal choice may not coincide with what would be the social r 
event the industry optimum. Thus incentives exist for firms to voluntarily come together to 
try and jointly increase their provision of traceability. Havinga (2006), in support of 
voluntary initiatives for providing traceability, argues that coalitions of a limited number of 
highly organized and fairly homogenous agents can exist whose collective private interest 
coincides with the public interest, and under certain conditions it may be possible for that 
coalition to achieve a socially optimal level of traceability.   
This study analyzes a model of a voluntary agreement designed to increase the 
provision of traceability which is used as a tool to mitigate the costs associated with a food-
safety outbreak. We adopt the stability concept of a self-enforcing agreement in order to 
determine the equilibrium number of members of a voluntary agreement, the aggregate level 
of traceability and the resulting cost to the industry of a food-safety outbreak. The goal of this 
research is to investigate to what extent an industry-led initiative of providing traceability can 
reduce the cost of a food-safety outbreak. Although the economics literature on the use of 
voluntary agreements for environmental protection is vast (e.g, Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; 
Barrett 1994; Khanna and Damon 1999; Alberini and Segerson 2002; Croci 2005; Ulph 2004; 
Kolstad 2007; Dawson and Segerson 2008; McEvoy and Stranlund 2008a) this paper is the 
first to apply the framework of a voluntary agreement to traceability systems. 
We find that when it is possible for firms to reduce the cost of a food-safety outbreak 
by cooperatively providing traceability, a voluntary agreement that leads to an increase in the 
level of traceability will always form. However, the actual number of firms that join the 
voluntary agreement will depend on the relative cost of providing traceability and the   5 
resulting benefit from a reduction in the cost of an outbreak. We find that voluntary 
agreements will typically garner less than full participation and therefore may not be entirely 
successful at achieving the socially optimal level of traceability.   
 
2. Background 
Traceability systems have the ability to “trace the history, application or location of that 
which is in consideration” (ISO 2000). Even though this is a very broad definition it does 
suggest traceability is a tool through which information on origin of products can be 
registered and shared. Moe (1998) distinguishes internal from chain traceability. The former 
denotes a system whereby internal information on a firm’s production processes is recorded. 
Chain traceability, on the other hand, tracks a product trough production, transportation, 
processing and eventually retail involving different firms. In this paper we are interested in 
chain traceability, and define traceability simply “as sharing information on food’s origin, 
attributes and production processes with the other agents in the market”. 
While in the early 1990s, traceability started to be implemented in the food industry 
mainly due to private motives (Gencod EAN France 2001), in the early 2000s both the EU 
and Japan created public initiatives to make traceability mandatory initially in the beef 
industry and then, in the EU, for all food sectors (European Parliament and Council 2002; 
Souza Monteiro and Caswell 2004). Traceability systems have both private and public 
values. Examples of private benefits of traceability are improved supply chain logistics, 
consumer’s trust, product differentiation or lower recall costs. Some of the public benefits of 
traceability are better risk management and limit public health impacts of food safety 
incidents (Meuwissen et al. 2003; Golan et al. 2004; Hobbs 2004). Golan et al. (2004) studied 
food traceability systems in the US and developed a framework to analyze whether existing 
private systems deliver an efficient level of traceability and how a regulator may induce the   6 
socially optimal level. Golan et al. found that there were different levels of traceability across 
industries and that each food industry has a specific traceability system. Moreover, although 
their findings suggest that systems in place were efficient in providing a private level of 
traceability, it was not possible to assess whether that coincided with the social optimum 
where both private and public interest should be considered. 
Hobbs (2004) analyses the introduction of traceability by an industry, individual firm 
or a regulator using a game-theory approach. She suggests a taxonomy of traceability systems 
according to product attributes and information problems, where three types of traceability 
system for food safety are considered. All these systems, regardless of whether they are an 
industry or individual’s firm initiative, may reduce exposure to ‘free-riders’ externality costs 
or liability in the case of an outbreak.  
Pouliot and Summer (2008) model the supply of safe food in a two-stage marketing 
channel, where homogeneous farms sell output to homogenous marketers who in turn sell to 
consumers. When traceability is not available, firms are anonymous and may free ride on the 
producers of safer food. Though unsafe food can originate either at the farm or marketer 
levels, food-safety issues increase in the number of firms in the supply chain and with 
imperfect traceability systems. In their model traceability is defined as an exogenous 
probability of identifying a source. Though this work relates to ours in the sense that it 
investigates the relationship between industry traceability degrees and food safety incidents, 
we depart from Pouliot and Sumner (2008) in that we only consider a level of firms in the 
chain and make the choice of traceability endogenous.   
Although voluntary agreements are not currently used to increase provision of 
traceability in food markets, a number of market-led standards recently emerged in the food 
industry (Fulponi 2006). These standards were initiated at different levels of food supply 
chains and address both environmental and food safety issues. One example is provided by   7 
EurepGAP, a scheme initially developed by an association of European retailers to harmonize 
standards imposed by different supermarket chains in their procurement strategies for fruits 
and vegetables. Recently this was renamed GlobalGAP, and now covers fruit and vegetable, 
flowers and ornamental, animal production, acquaculture, tea and coffee among and others. 
The scheme is quickly becoming a universal standard for producers worldwide aiming to get 
a contract with the increasing number of supermarkets or food service operations that require 
this standard (GlobalGAP 2008). 
Our research relates to both Golan et al. (2004) and Hobbs (2004) in that we focus on 
an industry-led traceability initiative. Like Hobbs (2004) we investigate the motivations for a 
firm or an industry to introduce traceability, however we analyze the formation of a voluntary 
agreement made between firms in order to increase industry-wide provision of traceability. 
Our analysis addresses one of the fundamental questions in Golan et al. (2004); that is, 
whether an industry-led traceability system (in our case, a voluntary agreement) can provide 
the optimal level of traceability. 
 
3. The model 
Traceability can be seen as the total amount of information on output origin, production 
processes and safety attributes a firm is willing to disclose. A reasonable assumption is that 
the higher the level of traceable information the lower the impact of a food safety hazard. 
This is because the larger the amount of information available on the location, origin and 
attributes of a given product at any given time the faster the process of tracking an incident.  
In the event of a food safety incident, in the short run firms in the industry will incur 
economic losses due to recall of products, forsaken sales, disposure of contaminated product 
and potential compensation to consumers due to health damages. These costs to the industry 
may be due to market or governmental responses. For example a regulator may issue a   8 
penalty on the industry for the societal losses or demand compensation for the cost of 
searching for the origin of a food safety outbreak and the need to dispose of contaminated 
foods. Depending on the liability rules prevalent in a country and the ability to held firms 
accountable for originating a food safety incident, each individual firm may have to 
internalize a proportion of the total costs of the food safety incident. Of course the faster is 
the finding of the origin and the more precisely is identified the extent of such incident the 
lower will be total costs. 
Towards a model of choice of traceability in food industries, consider a food industry 
comprising n homogeneous firms that each make a binary choice whether to provide 
traceability (i.e., revealed information regarding the production process of a specific food 
product) in order to minimize their total cost. Let ti equal one if firm i chooses to offer 
traceability and zero otherwise and t-i be the sum of traceability provided by all firms other 
than i, α be the individual cost of providing traceability, π be the probability of a food-safety 
issue occurring, A be the total cost to the industry of a food-safety issue and πA/n is the firm’s 
share of the expected cost of a food-safety issue. While the exact amount or proportion of 
total costs of food safety may vary from incident to incident and with other factors such as 
liability rules or the relation of power between firms in food chains, it is reasonable to assume 
that each firm will be held accountable for the average total industry loss. Individual firms 
choose ti to minimize 
1
( , ) 1 ( ) , i i i i i i
A
c t t t t t
n n
 
     
    = +   +        
                                [1] 
where ci is firm i’s cost function, α, A > 0, 0 1   <   , and
2 / A n     > so that all firms choose 
not to provide traceability in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In this baseline situation an 
individual firm’s cost is 
    / ,
b
i c A n   =                         [2]   9 
where the superscript b indicates a firm’s baseline cost function. If all firms in the industry 
provide traceability (i.e.,  i i t t n   + = ), then using [1] a firm’s cost is then 
    ,
f
i c   =                        [3] 
where the superscript f indicates a firm’s cost when all firms in the industry provide 
traceability.  
  If α ≤ πA/n then 0
o b
i i c c     when i i t t n   + = and therefore it is possible for firms to 
decrease their individual cost (at least weakly) by jointly agreeing to providing traceability. 
Thus, if α ≤ πA/n there is an incentive for the industry to try and increase their provision of 
traceability through a voluntary agreement. From here on we will restrict our analysis to 
situations in which α ≤ πA/n. 
3.1 The voluntary agreement 
Following Barrett (2003), we model the formation of a voluntary agreement in three stages. 
In the first stage the n firms decide independently whether to become a member to a 
voluntary agreement. Let s denote the number of members to a voluntary agreement. In the 
second stage, the s agreement members choose their level of traceability to minimize their 
joint costs. In stage three, the n – s non-member firms independently make the decision 
whether to provide traceability given the choices made by the agreement members in stage 
two. The equilibrium number of members to the agreement is solved by backward induction 
and hence we begin with stage three. 
Let the superscripts m and nm indicate a member and non-member firm, respectively. 
The cost function for a non-member firm is 
     1
1
1 ( ) ,
nm nm nm nm m
n s
A
c t t t st
n n
 
     
    = +   + +        
               [4]   10 
where  1
nm
n s t     is the aggregate traceability level of the other n – s – 1 non-member firms 
and
m st is the level of traceability provided by the member firms. Since non-member firms 
make their traceability decision independently, as before, each non-member minimizes its 
cost by choosing to not provide traceability in stage three.  
  In stage two, the s members to the voluntary agreement decide whether to provide 
traceability by minimizing their joint costs. Given that the n – s non-member firms do not 
provide traceability in stage three, using [1] the aggregate cost function of the agreement 
members can be written as ( ) / 1 (1/ )( ) ,
m m m sc st s A n n st     = +   and when simplified 
   
1
1 ( ) .




      = +          
                                                                           [5] 
The cost function of the agreement members is decreasing in s and since
2 / A n     > and α ≤ 
πA/n there exist coalition sizes that are strictly greater than one and weakly less than n in 
which the agreement members will minimize their costs by choosing to provide traceability. 
From [5] it is easily verified that the smallest coalition of members for which providing 
traceability is cost minimizing is 
    { } { }
2
min min | ( ) min | / .
m b
i s s c s c s s n A     =   =                                            [6] 
If
2 / s n A       from the first stage of the game, then the agreement members will minimize 
their joint costs by each providing traceability in stage two. Otherwise, if
2 / s n A     < the 
members will minimize their costs by choosing not to provide traceability in stage two. 
To determine the equilibrium number of firms that join the voluntary agreement in 
stage one, we adopt the stability concept of a self-enforcing agreement often used in the 
analysis of cartels (D’Aspremont et al. 1983), international environmental agreements 
(Barrett 1994; Kolstad 2007; McEvoy and Stranlund 2008a), and domestic voluntary 
agreements (Dawson and Segerson 2008; McEvoy and Stranlund 2008b). Following   11 
D’Aspremont et al. 1983, a voluntary agreement is considered stable if no existing member 
could benefit by leaving the agreement (internal stability) and no non-member could benefit 
by joining the agreement (external stability).  
Definition 1: A voluntary agreement consisting of s members is self-enforcing if and only if 
   
min min ( )  ( ) ( 1) for  , or  ( )  for   
( )  ( ) ( 1).
m nm m b
i
nm m
a c s c s s s c s c s s
b c s c s
    >   =
  +
      [7] 
Requirement (a) is that the agreement is internally stable in the sense that no member has an 
incentive to leave a self-enforcing agreement. Requirement (b) is that the agreement is 
externally stable in the sense that no non-member wishes to join the agreement. The only 
internally stable agreement size is the one with min s s = members. To see why, note that for s > 
min s  [4] and [5] reveal that ( ) ( 1)
m nm c s c s     implies 
2 / A n       which violates our 
assumption that
2 / A n     > . On the other hand, a voluntary agreement with min s members is 
internally stable because if one member of the agreement defected then the remaining 
members would minimize their costs by not providing traceability. The defector’s cost (as 
well as every other firm’s cost) would then be
b
i c , which is weakly less than min ( ).
m c s  Finally, 
a voluntary agreement with min s members is also externally stable. Using requirement (b) and 
[4] and [5],  ( ) ( 1)
nm m c s c s   + implies 
2 / A n       , which is satisfied because of our 
assumption
2 / A n     > . Since an agreement consisting of min s members is the only internally 
and externally stable agreement size, it is the equilibrium number of members of a self-
enforcing voluntary agreement.         
 
Proposition 1: Let the unique self-enforcing number of members to a voluntary agreement 
be
* s . Then
* s is the smallest coalition of agreement members necessary for the members to 
minimize their costs by providing traceability; that is,   12 
    { }
* 2
min min | / . s s s s n A     = =                    [8] 
The equilibrium number of members of a voluntary agreement is unique, strictly greater than 
1, and weakly less than n. Note that [8] indicates that participation with a voluntary 
agreement is increasing in the cost of providing traceability, α, and the number of firms and is 
decreasing in the expected cost of a food-safety issue, πA. 
 
4. Discussion and concluding remarks 
Traceability can reduce the total cost of a food safety incident by expediting the search for 
the origin of the problem and the time in which contaminated product is withdrawn from the 
market. Recent food safety outbreaks in American beef, produce and vegetables industries 
have shown how the lack of traceability can slow the investigation of the incident and affect 
most firms in the market, as well as consumers. In many situations, relying on traditional 
regulatory approaches to increase traceability is difficult. In terms of transactions costs, 
implementing mandatory traceability systems requires a lengthy legislative process and may 
create greater ill will between government and industries. Moreover, in some cases the 
government lacks the authority to require traceability in all food markets.  However, it may 
be possible to rely on the industry to create a traceability system that reduces exposure to 
losses due to food safety incidents. 
Here we propose a model to show that a voluntary agreement between a subset of 
firms in a food industry for the provision of traceability is feasible and reduces the cost to the 
industry of food safety outbreaks. In our model traceability is a binary choice that is costly to 
each firm but, at the aggregate level, reduces the expected total costs of safety incidents. If a 
firm decides not to provide traceability it will only be exposed to a proportion of the total 
industry expected cost of a food safety event. As long as the costs of providing traceability 
are larger than expected proportional costs of an incident to a firm, a rational agent has no   13 
incentive to implement traceability. The US has a fairly safe agro-food system and thus firms 
may perceive a low risk of incurring losses due to food safety hazards which is consistent 
with our baseline model, where individual firms are reluctant to incur cost to further reduce 
food safety risks. However, even lower probability events can materialize and in such 
occasions the consequences are quite extensive and the whole industry can be affected. In this 
event, the absence of information may further exacerbate the dimension of the problem, and 
motivate the need to implement traceability. This is what our industry level case reveals, 
which leads us to the formulation of the voluntary agreement. We show that while having no 
traceability may be the optimal decision for each firm, it is not the optimum for the industry 
as a whole. Then we demonstrate that if a group of firms in the industry commits to offer 
traceability the whole industry is better off in the sense that total expected costs of 
traceability and food safety incidents are minimized. Our model also suggests that the 
number of firms joining the coalition increases in the marginal cost of traceability and 
number of firms in the industry and decreases in the expected losses of the a food safety 
incident. 
The results support claims from both academics and public agency officials for 
private provision of traceability. However our model has some limitations that caution policy 
recommendations. First, we assume that each firm faces a proportional expected loss in the 
event of a food safety incident. Now, in reality this may not be the case because, under strict 
liability regimes (such as is the case in the US), the firm found responsible for the incident 
may face most if not all the losses. Also, unless firms can be correctly pinpointed it may be 
impossible to attribute costs to any particular firm. Second, our results critically rely on firm 
homogeneity, this is consistent with Havinga (2006) who argues that coalitions depend on the 
existence of homogenous firm with a common private interest. However, the reality is that 
the food system comprises highly differentiated firms and is perhaps better characterized by   14 
heterogeneity. This may cast doubts into the feasibility of an industry wide coalition for the 
provision of traceability. Finally, in this model we treat traceability as a binary choice. 
Nevertheless, as suggested by Pouliot and Summner (2008) there may be degrees of 
traceability which means that it may be better specified as a continuous variable rather than 
simply having it or not. In fact, Golan et al. (2004) define traceability in three dimensions: 
breadth (number of attributes traced); depth (number of layers in food chains involved) and 
precision (accuracy with each a product is pinpointed to its origin), reinforcing the case for a 
continuous variable modeling of traceability. 
Despite these limitations, that we aim to address in future research, we believe our 
model and results are an important contribution to the economics of food traceability and 
have important policy implications. In fact, our research is novel in two fundamental ways: 
first in our model the choice of traceability is endogenous. Second we apply for the first time 
a model of self-enforcement, commonly used in the environmental economics literature, to 
the case of food safety. Furthermore we suggest that food industries may be better of even if 
only a group of firms collectively decide to have traceability. Our work also raises empirical 
questions: which would be the minimum number of firms in a coalition that minimizes the 
costs of a food safety incident? What incentives would have to be created to facilitate the 
formation of coalitions?    15 
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